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West Papua are not included in this 
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Fiji
Fiji in 2007 was marked by cycles 
of conciliation and repression that 
echoed like seismic aftershocks from 
the December 2006 coup. Steps were 
taken by the new military-backed 
government to reconfi gure the estab-
lished order, by purges at the top of 
the public service and throughout the 
boards of the state-owned corpora-
tions; by reconstruction of the Great 
Council of Chiefs; and by reform of 
the Fijian Affairs Board, the Native 
Land Trust Board, and the Fiji Devel-
opment Bank. Although there was 
diplomatic disapproval for the over-
throw of Fiji’s elected government, the 
new regime’s reformist credentials, as 
well as its anticorruption and antira-
cist platform, won it a fair number of 
overseas admirers and some domes-
tic supporters. But the authoritarian 
aspect of the coup—that it fl ew in the 
face of majority ethnic Fijian opin-
ion—prevented any lasting consolida-
tion. Efforts to build legitimacy thus 
tended to generate mounting contro-
versy, while phases when criticisms 
grew brought a furious but realpolitik-
driven response.
On 4 January 2007, Republic of Fiji 
Military Forces (rfmf) Commander 
Frank Bainimarama relinquished his 
temporary position as president, and 
reappointed Ratu Josefa Iloilo as 
head of state. A month earlier, Ratu 
Josefa had been removed from that 
offi ce because he had disassociated 
himself from the coup, on the advice 
of Roko Tui Bau and Vice President 
Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi. Bainimarama 
had, at that time, said he was only 
temporarily “stepping into the shoes 
of the President” (Bainimarama 2006). 
Now restored to offi ce, the eighty-
six-year-old president lamented that 
cultural reasons had prevented him 
from “fully performing [his] duties” 
on 5 December 2006, referring to the 
anti-coup pressure from his sacked 
high-ranking deputy. But he said that 
he “would have done exactly what the 
Commander of the rfmf, Commo-
dore Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama did 
since it was necessary to do so at the 
time” (Iloilo 2007). Read from a script 
prepared by military offi cers who had, 
over the previous month, kept him 
virtually secluded from public contact, 
the speech was carefully contrived to 
fi t the anticipated “doctrine of neces-
sity” defense of the coup before the 
courts. Yet it constituted a gross abdi-
cation of the president’s constitutional 
responsibilities. The normally obsequi-
ous Methodist Church, doubting that 
the president was in full possession 
of his faculties, suggested that he be 
“medically boarded, and if neces-
sary, retired with dignity and respect” 
(Methodist Church 2007; see also 
Fraenkel 2007).
The next day, Bainimarama was 
formally appointed prime minister, 
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ending the month-long tenure of 
that post by the army camp medical 
practitioner, Dr Jona Senilagakali. 
“Extra-constitutional steps,” Bainima-
rama insisted, had been “necessary to 
preserve the Constitution,” claiming 
that legal precedents existed for such 
usage of “reserve powers” (Bainima-
rama 2007a). These arguments 
strongly resembled those put forward 
by Fiji Human Rights Commission 
Director Shaista Shameem (2007a, 
2007b), but they found little sup-
port among Fiji’s senior lawyers (Ali 
2007a, 2008). Ostensibly to facilitate 
an inquiry into the activities of the 
judiciary at the time of the 2000 coup, 
Chief Justice Daniel Fatiaki and Chief 
Magistrate Naomi Matanitobua were 
sent on leave a day before the presi-
dential handover. At the instigation of 
the attorney general, a hastily con-
vened meeting of the Judicial Services 
Commission, chaired by Judge Nazhat 
Shameem (Shaista Shameem’s sister), 
appointed Justice Anthony Gates as 
acting chief justice. That appointment 
was defended by the attorney general, 
but it was deemed unconstitutional by 
most legal scholars (Crawford 2007; 
Cox 2007; Leung 2007). It signaled 
the start of a wholesale restructuring 
of the judiciary, resulting in the August 
resignation of most of Fiji’s Court of 
Appeal judges.
On 6 January, Bainimarama, now 
fi guring as prime minister, outlined 
the “President’s mandate” that was 
intended to guide his interim admin-
istration. The new government would 
provide amnesty for the soldiers who 
had carried out the coup; it would 
validate the decrees, suspensions, 
dismissals, and appointments of the 
past month; and it would set out to 
eradicate corruption. The sixteen-
member interim lineup included two 
former rfmf commanders, Ratu 
Epeli Nailatikau as foreign minister, 
and Ratu Epeli Ganilau as minister 
of Fijian affairs. Both men have close 
links to the family of deceased former 
President Ratu Mara, leading some 
to depict the 2006 coup as signaling 
the reemergence of Fiji’s long-eclipsed 
eastern chiefs. Several other minis-
ters were unsuccessful candidates for 
Ganilau’s National Alliance Party of 
Fiji at the 2006 polls. Also included 
was the little-known Aiyaz Sayed-
Khaiyum, who was to play a high-
profi le role in the media for the new 
government as attorney general.
In an astonishing turnaround, the 
principal victim of the 2000 coup, 
Mahendra Chaudhry, joined the 
government as minister of fi nance, as 
well as assuming the national plan-
ning, public enterprise, and sugar 
portfolios. The constitutionality of 
the coup was “yet to be determined,” 
explained Chaudhry, and would not 
be resolved “for a very long time” 
(Pacnews, 9 Feb 2007). He said that 
he had the backing of the Fiji Labour 
Party (flp) and the National Farmers’ 
Union. Chaudhry’s loyal ally, Lekh 
Ram Vayeshnoi, became minister for 
youth and sports, and the only other 
flp member of cabinet. The coup 
had been a “revolution for clean up,” 
Vayeshnoi told a military passing-out 
parade in June, claiming that it had 
“effectively removed all vestiges of 
racial discrimination in this country” 
and that “today this country moves 
on steadily and unburdened by racial 
or ethnic considerations” (FijiLive, 25 
June 2007; Fiji Daily Post, 22 June 
2007). It was an extraordinary claim, 
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for the December coup as well as the 
presence of Chaudhry and Vayeshnoi 
in the cabinet drew strong and almost 
universal criticism from indigenous 
Fijians, even if the rfmf monopoly 
over the country’s armaments pre-
vented any violent resistance.
The formation of the new govern-
ment also made clearer the direction 
of the ongoing reshaping of the state 
administration. Most of the former 
government’s chief executive offi cers 
(ceos) in the ministries had been 
sacked, although Public Enterprises 
ceo Parmesh Chand had chosen to 
accept appointment as the top civil 
servant in the prime minister’s offi ce. 
The new government resolved to abol-
ish the ceo positions and revert back 
to lower-paid permanent secretaries. 
In early January, Bainimarama assured 
the public that rfmf offi cers would 
not benefi t from his appointment as 
prime minister (FijiLive, 5 Jan 2007). 
But soon military offi cers were being 
positioned throughout the ministries, 
including Esala Teleni as chief of 
police, Viliame Naupoto as director of 
immigration, and Ioane Naivalurua as 
commissioner of prisons. The boards 
of all the state-owned enterprises 
were overhauled, with those who had 
been appointed by Laisenia Qarase or 
known coup critics terminated—usu-
ally following allegations of corrup-
tion. Their replacements were often 
flp members, as for example with 
Fiji Trades Union Congress leaders 
Felix Anthony and Daniel Urai, who 
were given posts on the board of the 
Fiji National Provident Fund. Most 
of Fiji’s ambassadors and high com-
missioners were recalled, although the 
foreign minister frequently struggled 
to gain overseas acceptance for their 
replacements. It was not only Qarase’s 
Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua 
(sdl) Party that was left out in the 
cold, but also the National Federation 
Party (nfp), the smaller of the two 
largely Fiji Indian-backed parties. nfp 
leaders like Attar Singh and Pramod 
Rae were to become key critics of 
the new government, and steadfastly 
opposed the coup.
In accordance with the objectives of 
the “cleanup campaign,” the promised 
Fiji Independent Commission against 
Corruption (ficac) was established in 
April, and the president of LawAsia, 
Mah Weng Kwai, was later recruited 
as commissioner. This prompted out-
rage from Court of Appeal President 
Justice Gordon Ward, and Mah Kwai 
resigned. Bereft of effective leader-
ship, controversial policeman Nasir 
Ali took up the reins as ficac chief 
investigator and conducted a series of 
high-profi le raids on institutions such 
as Fijian Holdings Ltd, the Native 
Land Trust Board, and even Fiji Police 
headquarters. These uncovered little, 
and Nasir Ali was transferred back 
into the police force in favor of a 
lower-key approach spearheaded by 
Lieutenant Colonel George Langman. 
Other investigations––undertaken by 
the Independent Investigating Team 
into Institutions Fijian, headed by 
Colonel Apakuki Kurusiga––targeted 
the provincial councils, the Native 
Land Trust Board, the Fijian Affairs 
Board, the Native Lands Commis-
sion, and the Fijian Scholarship Unit. 
Most striking, a year after the coup, 
was how little evidence of corruption 
had been found, despite strenuous 
efforts. Conversely, criticism began to 
intensify about corruption, nepotism, 
and abuse of public funds by the new 
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offi ceholders, within the Fiji military, 
and even by senior interim ministers.
The Great Council of Chiefs (Bose 
Levu Vakaturaga, or blv) had been 
forbidden from meeting in December 
2006, after refusing to “reappoint” 
Ratu Josefa Iloilo as president. In 
the new year, the council was recon-
vened with Bainimarama’s blessing 
to appoint a new vice president. 
Foreign Minister Ratu Epeli Nailati-
kau, a potential if somewhat distant 
claimant of the long-vacant Vunivalu 
title on Bau Island, was the rfmf-
favored candidate. But again the 
chiefs refused, despite pressure from 
Ratu Mara’s son, Lieutenant Colonel 
Tevita Uluilakeba Mara, one of the 
chiefl y delegates from the Lau group. 
The commander responded angrily, 
disbanding the council and initiat-
ing an ambitious restructuring of the 
chiefl y body under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Fijian Affairs. A review 
team, headed by Ratu Tu‘uakitau 
Cokanauto, toured the country seek-
ing submissions. Aside from a few 
converts, most of Fiji’s leading chiefs 
remained virulently opposed to the 
new order. Some, like former Educa-
tion Minister Ro Teimumu Kepa and 
her nephew Ro Filipe Tuisawau from 
Rewa, adopted a high profi le. Others, 
like Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu (from 
Somosomo on Taveuni) and the Cako-
bau siblings (from Bau Island) avoided 
statements to the national press, 
but they were equally hostile. Ratu 
Epenisa Cakobau, a regular at the 
bars of downtown Suva, was arrested 
and prosecuted for punching Baini-
marama’s son in a nightclub. Only 
in Lau, the island group to Fiji’s east 
that had prospered politically under 
Ratu Mara, did Fijian chiefs favor-
ably receive the new order, although 
a discernible ambivalence was evident 
even there.
The years of Fijian chiefs playing 
the central role in national affairs 
seemed a distant memory from the 
vantage point of 2007. Before the 
coup, Bainimarama had told the chiefs 
that they should “meet under a mango 
tree and enjoy home brew” (The Aus-
tralian, 22 Nov 2006). It was a com-
ment often recalled by Fijians  during 
the year, and one that refl ected the 
humorous bravado of the grog bowl 
that often characterized the command-
er’s outbursts. “The blv itself is in 
many senses a symbol,” deposed Vice 
President Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi told 
a workshop in Canberra in July; “in 
treating it in such a cavalier and con-
temptuous manner, the Commander 
exposed the facade of its authority. 
This has compounded the erosion of 
traditional authority structures. That 
may not be such a bad thing, replete 
as it is with shibboleths and anach-
ronisms which need to be cleared” 
(Madraiwiwi 2007; Fiji Times, 26 July 
2007). Ironically, a giant, splendidly 
designed, f$30 million complex to 
house the Great Council of Chiefs 
was being erected through 2007 along 
the Suva foreshore––a project dubbed 
by some prominent Fijians “a monu-
mental folly of our time” (Nadroga 
businessman Radike Qereqeretabua, 
quoted in Fiji Times, 24 July 2007).
The coup was accompanied by 
a surge of human rights violations, 
as the Fiji military struggled to keep 
reasonably fi rm control. Civil society 
activists, lawyers, and sdl ministers, 
as well as those who spoke out in the 
press, were apprehended and taken 
into military barracks, where they 
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were threatened and forced to undergo 
humiliating “exercises” (for further 
details, see Fraenkel 2007, 433–434). 
At least two Fijians were killed: 
Nimilote Verebasaga, following rfmf 
intervention in a dispute about the 
expiry of Indian leases at Nakaulevu, 
and nineteen-year-old Sakiusa Rabaka, 
after undergoing rfmf interroga-
tion at the Black Rock Reservoir 
near Nadi. In October, the Director 
of Public Prosecutions Offi ce halted 
an attempt to smuggle those soldiers 
accused of Rabaka’s killing out of 
the country on a UN-chartered fl ight 
bound for Iraq.
Troops had been withdrawn 
from the checkpoints in April, and 
the public emergency regulations 
were withdrawn on 31 May, lead-
ing to greater calm. But travel bans 
remained, preventing prominent civil 
society activists, lawyers, and politi-
cians from leaving Fiji. Lieutenant 
Colonel Pita Driti also continued to 
pursue the critical Internet bloggers, 
threatening students at the University 
of the South Pacifi c with termination 
of scholarships. Triggering renewed 
outcry from Wellington, New Zealand 
High Commissioner Michael Green 
was expelled in June, and a journalist 
arriving to report that incident, Mike 
Field, was deported soon thereafter. 
In November, eleven men—including 
former military offi cers, Naitasiri high 
chief Ratu Inoke Takiveikata, and 
Fiji Indian businessman Ballu Khan—
were arrested, on the basis of scanty 
evidence, for allegedly conspiring to 
assassinate Bainimarama, Chaudhry, 
and others in the interim cabinet.
The regime’s sternest test, however, 
came in August. Chaudhry’s March 
mini-budget included plans for a 5 
percent wage cut for the public-sector 
unions. The interim government also 
wanted to reduce the retirement age 
from 60 to 55, and to withdraw from 
the partnership agreement negoti-
ated under the pre-coup government. 
Trades union reaction was inevitable, 
but it exposed the deep schisms in 
Fiji’s labor movement. The flp-aligned 
Trades Union Congress (ftuc), whose 
leaders like Felix Anthony and Daniel 
Urai had assumed positions in the new 
order, dropped plans for strike action 
after 1 percent of the 5 percent cut 
was rescinded. The rival nfp-allied 
Fiji Islands Council of Trades Unions 
(fictu) did not. The Fiji Nurses Asso-
ciation also struck, with leader Kuini 
Lutua protesting that nurses were 
“always facing pay cuts whenever a 
military coup took place” (FijiLive, 
26 July 2007). She condemned fituc 
General Secretary Felix Anthony, and 
Fiji Teachers Union (ftu) leader Agni 
Deo Singh, both former flp members 
of Parliament, for having brokered a 
politically inspired deal with interim 
Finance Minister and flp leader 
Mahendra Chaudhry (FijiLive, 11 July 
2007). As tension mounted ahead of 
the strike, checkpoints reappeared in 
the urban centers. Fiji tv screened 
footage of soldiers and riot police 
conducting drills with batons, shields, 
and guns (Fiji tv, 20 July 2007). 
Taniela Tabu, general secretary of the 
fictu-allied Viti National Union of 
Taukei Workers, was apprehended 
and assaulted by soldiers, apparently 
under the watching gaze of Lieuten-
ant Colonel Pita Driti and the Military 
Council.
The nurses’ strike nevertheless went 
ahead. Minister of Labour Bernadette 
Rounds Ganilau resisted pressures 
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to refer the dispute to the permanent 
arbitrator for resolution, insisting that 
her hands were tied by Bainimarama. 
“This government is not going to 
budge,” announced the prime minister, 
explaining, “We do not have to worry 
about votes” (FijiLive, 3 Aug 2007). 
While Fiji Teachers Union members 
remained at work, the rival Fijian 
Teachers Association went on strike. 
Education Minister Netani Sukana-
ivalu responded by bringing forward 
the school holidays, catching the Fijian 
teachers off guard and eliminating 
the strike’s pressure on government. 
Faced with the prospect of forfeiting 
pay to no avail, the teachers returned 
to work. Nurses remained on strike 
for several days, but soon the trickle 
of health workers returning to work 
turned into a fl ood, and Kuini Lutua 
called off the eighteen-day strike. It 
was a bitter defeat, and one that fur-
ther added to the sense of rancor and 
political frustration in the indigenous 
Fijian community.
The return of Qarase to Suva in 
September proved the occasion for 
yet another ratcheting up of tension, 
again triggering a backlash. Shortly 
after the coup, Qarase had gone back 
to his home island of Vanuabalavu in 
the Lau group. The Fiji military had 
instructed domestic airlines not to 
transport him back to Suva, thereby 
trapping him on the island. On 1 Sep-
tember he was allowed to return to 
the capital after a high court ruling, 
triggering a blaze of publicity. Qarase 
declared a willingness to negotiate 
with the commander, but rejected the 
idea of working in an interim cabi-
net under Chaudhry. Bainimarama 
responded by again condemning 
Qarase’s “racist policies and actions” 
and insisting that “we are fi ghting 
against everything he stands for” 
(FijiLive, 3 Sept 2007). In a sign of just 
how personal this antagonism was, 
Bainimarama’s offi ce announced that 
Qarase would forfeit all the normal 
privileges of former prime ministers, 
including free provision of security, 
transport, pension, and medical treat-
ment (Fiji Times, 6 Sept 2006). Intent 
on nipping in the bud any resurgence 
of opposition to the coup, the interim 
government reactivated public emer-
gency regulations on 6 September. Hit-
ting out at the resulting protests, the 
commander told local nongovernmen-
tal association activists to “shut their 
mouths,” and extolled the popularity 
among urban property owners of the 
postcoup checkpoints for their role in 
bringing down the crime rate.
To handle his deposed adversary, 
Bainimarama henceforth insisted that 
any dialogue with Qarase should 
take place under the auspices of the 
National Council for Building a Bet-
ter Fiji (ncbbf). Formally launched 
in October, this council was tasked 
with devising a “People’s Charter for 
Change and Progress” (ncbbf 2007). 
Co-chaired by the Commander and 
Catholic Archbishop Petero Mataca, 
it was intended to bind future elected 
governments and eradicate forever 
the politics of race. Among the forty-
member council, fourteen were from 
the government and twenty-six from 
civil society. The Arya Samaj and 
Sanatan Dharm (the two main north 
Indian organizations) joined, as did 
the Ecumenical Centre for Research, 
Education and Advocacy; the Citizens’ 
Constitutional Forum, and the Fiji 
Chamber of Commerce. Media Coun-
cil Chairman Daryl Tarte and former 
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Opposition leader Mick Beddoes also 
joined, although both were to resign 
in protest in March 2008. Technical 
Director John Samy, a former Asian 
Development Bank consultant, played 
the key behind-the-scenes role. He 
emphasized the role of the charter in 
promoting economic development and 
in offering an “exit strategy” for Baini-
marama. In response to  critics who 
pointed to the marked  lack of ethnic 
Fijian enthusiasm for the ncbbf, Samy 
said that the council had kept vacant 
seats for the Methodists and Qarase’s 
sdl party, should they choose to join.
For the sdl, however, the ncbbf 
was a poisoned chalice. While pub-
licly committing himself to elections 
by March 2009 at the Pacifi c Islands 
Forum (pif) in Tonga in mid-Octo-
ber, moments later the commander 
told reporters that “if anybody with 
Qarase-like policies comes in, the 
charter will automatically remove 
him” (Fiji Times, 18 Oct 2007). This 
echoed an intention conveyed ear-
lier by the shadowy Military Coun-
cil, which was regularly convening 
straight after each cabinet meeting. 
The pif Eminent Persons’ Group 
had been told in January that Fiji 
needed a population census and a 
redrawing of constituency boundar-
ies before another election could be 
held (pif 2007). This “roadmap” 
had been embraced by the European 
Union as critical to its release of 
f$400 million for restructuring the 
sugar industry. Now further hurdles 
were being erected, including the 
need for a blacklisting of race-based 
parties and radical electoral reform 
that would inevitably entail abroga-
tion or substantial amendment of the 
1997 constitution. Another bizarre 
document released by the Fiji Human 
Rights Commission in September, 
“Report of the Commission of Inquiry 
into the Fiji 2006 General Elections,” 
sought to unearth proof that Qarase 
had rigged the previous polls, based 
only on hearsay from a very restricted 
sample of respondents (fhrc 2007). If 
so, the coup supporters argued, many 
administrative matters needed to be 
set right before any future holding of 
elections.
Yet the real obstacles to fresh elec-
tions were political, not technical. The 
support base for the new regime was 
not fi rm. In the May 2006 election, 
four of every fi ve ethnic Fijians had 
voted sdl. The bitter experience of the 
2006 coup, the attacks on the Great 
Council of Chiefs and the Methodist 
Church, the public-sector strikes, and 
human rights abuses had increased 
Fijian support for Qarase’s party. By 
keeping Chaudhry close, Bainimarama 
might be able to count on the support 
of the majority of Fiji Indians, but this 
would not be enough to control the 
next government. As the 2007 Census 
of Population fi gures indicated, indig-
enous Fijians had risen to 57 percent 
of the population, while Fiji Indians 
were down to 37 percent. Ideally, a 
centrist party—like that launched 
by Ratu Epeli Ganilau for the 2006 
polls—might emerge and capture 
enough Fijian votes to permit a coali-
tion government with the Fiji Labour 
Party. But Ganilau’s National Alliance 
Party of Fiji (napf) had obtained only 
2.9 percent of the vote in May 2006, 
and had not gained a single seat. The 
advantage of incumbency, and the new 
alliances occasioned by jockeying for 
position in the postcoup order, might 
boost a little support for a regime-
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backed Fijian party or coalition with 
the flp, but a revamped napf seemed 
unlikely to become a major player in 
a postelection government formation 
process.
The 2006 coup was a coup to end 
all coups, Bainimarama told the UN 
General Assembly on 29 September. 
It was justifi ed by racism, corrup-
tion, and poor governance under 
Qarase, and by an intensifying eco-
nomic decline that threatened social 
catastrophe (Bainimarama 2007b). 
Such claims were frequently made, at 
the United Nations in New York, at 
the Pacifi c Islands Forum meeting in 
Tonga, and repeatedly at home in Fiji 
throughout 2007. They were not wild 
fabrications, but they were grossly 
exaggerated.
Qarase’s legislative program had 
been contrived to appeal narrowly to 
the indigenous Fijians, and thus to 
offset the challenge experienced from 
George Speight in May–July 2000 
(Fraenkel 2000; Fraenkel and Firth 
2007). Central to this had been the 
poorly conceived “50:50 by 2020” 
program, otherwise known as the 
Blueprint for Affi rmative Action for 
Indigenous Fijians and Rotumans. 
But affi rmative action was not new 
to the Qarase government, nor was 
it a vast element in that government’s 
expenditure. All politicians claimed to 
be intent on somehow uplifting Fijian 
living standards. None of the three 
key contentious pieces of legislation 
that so infuriated Bainimarama—the 
ill-conceived Reconciliation, Toler-
ance and Unity Bill; the Qoliqoli Bill; 
and the Indigenous Claims Tribunal 
Bill—had been enacted by the time 
of the coup, and the power-sharing 
cabinet formed after the May 2006 
polls might well have halted these 
altogether, or at least watered them 
down. As the commander told the 
United Nations, some of the 2000 
coup conspirators had been released 
from prison under Qarase, or had 
been given high-ranking govern-
ment positions, mostly because they 
held high chiefl y status or potentially 
delivered powerful provincial back-
ing to the government. Yet Speight 
himself remained under lock and key, 
and most of his fellow conspirators 
had served out their prison terms (see 
Bhim 2007). A key fi gure in the sdl 
hierarchy, Naitasiri chief Ratu Inoke 
Takiveikata—convicted for high trea-
son for his part in the mutiny at the 
army’s Queen Elizabeth Barracks in 
November 2000—had remained in jail 
(although ironically he was released 
after the 2006 coup, when about-to-
resign Court of Appeal judges over-
turned the conviction of Ratu Inoke by 
Justice Anthony Gates, on the grounds 
that Gates had publicly indicated bias 
against the Naitasiri chief). The latest 
coup perpetrators seemed unlikely to 
face a similar fate.
Most centrally, despite the core 
coup justifi cation of initiating a 
“cleanup campaign” against corrup-
tion, by the end of 2007 little evidence 
of corruption had been found. Former 
sdl campaign manager Jale Baba 
had been identifi ed as having sold off 
a second-hand government vehicle 
for f$700 for private gain (Fiji Sun, 
29 Jan 2007), and there were some 
minor revelations of tax evasion and 
abuse of offi cial purchasing privileges. 
But nothing had been found against 
Qarase or any of his ministers. Talk 
of the cleanup campaign thus faded 
toward the second part of 2007, 
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replaced by a growing emphasis on 
the utopian objective of transcend-
ing race antagonisms via electoral 
reform. In a discernibly new twist in 
the ever-changing case for the 2006 
coup, squabbling politicians pander-
ing to unruly electorates were blamed 
for Fiji’s troubles, and the potential 
role of the unelected armed forces in 
encouraging economic development 
and increasing living standards was 
extolled (Devi 2007).
Bainimarama’s claims before 
the United Nations of impending 
economic catastrophe prior to the 
December 2006 coup were also wildly 
overstated. The economy had not 
been strong prior to the 2006 coup, 
although tourism and construction 
were booming. But it shrank by at 
least 4 percent in 2007. The Vatukoula 
gold mine closed on the day of the 
coup, and sugar and garment manu-
facturing remained in the doldrums. 
Remittances, which had peaked in 
2006, fell back in 2007. Crucially, 
tourist arrivals tumbled, despite offers 
of knockdown hotel deals. Chaudhry’s 
March mini-budget had cut intended 
government spending from f$1.7 to 
f$1.5 billion, whereas most econo-
mists advised devaluation and defi cit 
spending. Yet much remained con-
cealed beneath the surface, includ-
ing the rfmf’s budget blowout. The 
buildup of infl ationary pressures over 
2007, only partly driven by external 
factors, suggested more liberal spend-
ing than offi cially planned or recorded. 
Balance of payments pressures, and 
the threat of devaluation, remained 
severe for the fi rst half of 2007, until 
the domestic economic slowdown 
relieved pressures by substantially 
reducing imports. 
The year 2007 thus ended as 
it began, with a coup still uncon-
solidated. The challenges ahead were 
many: economic, legal, and above all 
political. The cyclical pattern of waves 
of repression followed by phases of 
attempted negotiation and conciliation 
looked set to continue into 2008. 
jon fraenkel
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New Caledonia
After three years of ad hoc, issue-by-
issue cooperation in the Congress of 
New Caledonia between the loyal-
ist but centrist Avenir Ensemble (ae, 
or “Future Together”) and various 
pro-independence parties in the 
Front de Libération Nationale Kanak 
et Socialiste (fl nks), the formerly 
dominant Gaullist Rassemblement 
pour la Calédonie dans la République 
(rpcr) reconfi rmed its control over 
New Caledonian representation in 
the French Parliament, thanks in part 
to the victory of Nicolas Sarkozy as 
successor to Gaullist Jacques Chirac in 
the presidential election. But the new 
regime in Paris confi rmed France’s 
commitment to the Noumea Accord 
of 1998, which stipulates a gradual 
devolution of self-governing powers 
to the territory (since 2003 referred to 
offi cially as a semi-autonomous “over-
seas entity”) and working toward a 
“common destiny” for this multieth-
nic society. Progress continued in the 
development of new nickel mining 
projects despite ongoing concerns over 
environmental pollution; in economic 
growth, despite rising problems with a 
high cost of living and homelessness; 
in the recognition of Kanak cultural 
identity and the teaching of Kanak 
languages; and in the country’s role 
in the Pacifi c region. Militant labor 
unions remained as active as ever, even 
forming a new Labor Party.
The rpcr had dominated local poli-
tics for many years, building a repu-
tation for not consulting much with 
other parties in making government 
decisions. But in the 2004 provincial 
elections, loyalist opponents and dissi-
dents formed the ae coalition and won 
control of Congress and the Southern 
Province. Since then it has been the 
rpcr’s turn to complain about being 
marginalized in government decision-
making. So, starting in 2006, rpcr 
leader Pierre Frogier began a strident 
campaign reminiscent of the fear tac-
tics that had polarized the country in 
the 1980s. In a bid to appeal to French 
loyalists, especially recent immigrants, 
Frogier opposed the freezing of the 
electorate in congressional elections 
and referendums on independence, 
calling the concept (embedded in the 
Noumea Accord, which he signed in 
1998) a violation of human rights. 
The fl nks, on the other hand, has 
been struggling for twenty-fi ve years 
against allowing new migrants from 
France and its other Pacifi c territo-
ries to vote on the country’s destiny, 
considering that in the 1970s France 
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orchestrated an immigration wave 
that brought in 25,000 people, during 
a nickel boom, to make a minority of 
parties wanting autonomy or indepen-
dence. The fl nks adheres strongly to 
the Noumea Accord, which stipulated 
that only those who had been resi-
dents for ten years in 1998, or their 
adult descendants, could vote in key 
congressional elections or referen-
dums. But Frogier has complained that 
such a stipulation would exclude 11 
percent of residents who could already 
vote in national, municipal, and 
even European Union elections; and 
in Noumea, the capital, perhaps 20 
percent of voters would be excluded, 
including many rpcr supporters. 
Because French presidential and 
legislative elections were approaching 
in 2007, the rhetoric grew more shrill 
as 2006 came to a close, and some 
members of the Gaullist allies of the 
rpcr in France, Chirac’s ump (Union 
pour un Mouvement Populaire) joined 
the debate, while the Socialists (gener-
ally pro-fl nks) and the centrist udf 
(Union pour la Démocratie Fran-
çaise, to which many ae members 
adhere) tended to side with the fl nks 
viewpoint to uphold the consensual 
Noumea Accord and the organic laws 
that enacted it in 1999. 
As the issue moved through met-
ropolitan and European institutions, 
the fl nks interpretation prevailed. 
As early as 2005, the European Court 
of Human Rights had approved the 
frozen electorate, and in March 2006 
the French Council of Ministers did 
the same. But in December 2006 and 
early 2007, the rpcr nevertheless 
mobilized opponents of the concept in 
what was clearly an electoral gambit 
for the 2007 elections. Senator Simon 
Loueckhote even proposed that three 
rather than ten years of residence 
should suffi ce for all voters, and in 
January 2007 the rpcr coalition 
warned that the fl nks and its allies 
wanted to “confi scate the right to 
vote” and ultimately impose an “ultra-
communalist” notion of citizenship 
“based on blood, and not on soil,” 
thereby creating second class citi-
zens (kol, 8 Jan 2007). ae territorial 
President Marie-Noëlle Thémereau 
called Frogier “irresponsible” because 
he himself had signed the Noumea 
Accord (Le Monde, 15 Jan 2007). 
Ironically, many loyalists now in the 
ae had not signed the accord, and 
had also voted against its approval in 
1998. Despite the acrimonious debates 
and demonstrations, in December 
2006 the French National Assembly 
adopted the frozen electorate for New 
Caledonian congressional elections 
in 2009 and 2014 and in the possible 
independence referendums (NC, 15 
Dec 2006). In January the French Sen-
ate followed suit, and the combined 
Parliament did likewise in February, 
by 724 votes to 91 with 55 absten-
tions, thus enshrining the principle in 
the French national constitution (NC, 
18 Jan, 21 Feb 2007). 
In April and May, the French 
presidential election pitted primar-
ily Sarkozy of Chirac’s ump against 
Ségolène Royal of the Socialists and 
François Bayrou of the udf (former 
President Giscard d’Estaing’s party), 
though lesser candidates like anti-
immigration Jean-Marie Le Pen of the 
Front National (fn) and anti-global-
ization activist José Bové made the 
campaign colorful. In New Caledonia, 
the rpcr and some ae members who 
belong to the ump campaigned for 
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Sarkozy, Didier Leroux of the ae cam-
paigned for Bayrou, and liberals and 
pro-independence supporters backed 
Royal, while the local fn supported 
Le Pen and radical labor unions sup-
ported Bové. In 2006, a French court 
had convicted Le Pen of inciting racial 
hatred because of his anti-immigra-
tion venom, yet in New Caledonia 
the immigrant fn opposes the frozen 
electorate as racist (bbc News, 16 
April 2007; NC, 4 Dec 2006). After the 
fi rst round of voting on 22 April, in 
which a record 85 percent of French 
voters participated, Sarkozy and Royal 
had a run-off on 6 May, with the ump 
leader winning 53 percent of the fi nal 
vote (bbc News, 22 April, 6 May 
2007). In New Caledonia, the Kanak-
ruled North and Islands provinces 
voted about three-to-one for Royal, 
reaching as high as 93 percent in some 
communes, while the immigrant-domi-
nated South did the opposite, with 
80 percent of Noumeans choosing 
Sarkozy. Because the South is more 
populous, overall 63 percent of New 
Caledonians voted for Sarkozy (NC, 7 
May 2007). He promised to uphold 
French honor, identity, and security, 
and to promote economic growth 
while reducing taxes (NC, 8 May 
2007). 
The rpcr-ump regarded Sarkozy’s 
victory as a plebiscite for its loyalist 
platform, since the South, where the 
turnout was 76 percent of the elector-
ate, had voted overwhelmingly for 
him. The fn and many in the ae had 
also supported Sarkozy in the runoff, 
since both are loyalist, and Loueck-
hote conceded that the frozen elector-
ate issue did not really change much. 
Turnout in the pro-Royal North had 
been 63 percent, but in the Islands 
only 37 percent, while in the South, 
Bayrou got more votes than Royal did 
(NC, 7–8 May 2007). In the French 
legislative elections of May and June, 
eleven local candidates presented 
themselves for the two deputy seats 
in the National Assembly. For once, 
the fl nks showed more unity than its 
loyalist opponents did, but districting 
and demography favored the loyal-
ists: Noumea was grouped with the 
much less populated outer islands in 
the fi rst district, and the populous 
suburbs of the South were grouped 
with the “Bush” (small communes and 
Kanak tribes on Grande Terre) in the 
second district. The competition was 
intense between the rpcr-ump and the 
ae, complicated by various dissident 
groups and the fn (NC, 7 May 2007). 
With Jacques Lafl eur (who founded the 
rpcr in 1978) and his longtime aide, 
Algerian pied noir Pierre  Maresca, 
pushed to the loyalist margins in 2006, 
Frogier ran in the second district for 
the rpcr-ump and Gaël Yanno in the 
fi rst. Both Lafl eur and Maresca would 
run in the legislative election but with-
out signifi cant support (NC, 16 April, 
5 May, 11 May 2007). 
Frogier argued that the Noumea 
Accord needed to be “dusted off” and 
reconsidered, because it was not, he 
said, a magic incantation nor a sacred 
talisman. He claimed that the freezing 
of the New Caledonian electorate by 
France was caused more by the guilt 
felt by Chirac over the 1988 Ouvea 
massacre than by real dialogue. Worse, 
the fl nks goal of a local citizenship 
and favoritism in hiring for local-born 
residents “creates a sort of nationality 
before its time. It’s really independence 
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that they are preparing” (NC, 2 March, 
14 June 2007). He criticized the new 
primary school history and geography 
textbook that the local congress had 
paid for, because its preface was signed 
by the president of New Caledonia, 
Thémereau of the ae, and by Charles 
Washetine, the pro-independence min-
ister of education; he said both were 
playing politics (NC, 9 March 2007). 
The ae would propose Southern Prov-
ince President Philippe Gomes as can-
didate for deputy in the fi rst district 
and Congress President Harold Martin 
of the ump in the second, thus alienat-
ing Leroux, who was of the udf, and 
thereby splitting the ae voters (NC, 12 
April, 11 May 2007). After more than 
a decade of dissension, the pro-inde-
pendence Union Calédonienne (uc) 
agreed to form a single ticket with the 
rest of the fl nks, which was led by 
Palika (Parti de Libération Kanak). 
Together, they proposed Washetine of 
Palika in the fi rst district and Charles 
Pidjot of the uc in the second, who 
both upheld the Noumea Accord 
(NC, 13–15 June 2007). The only real 
dissidence came from the powerful 
pro-independence labor union, ustke 
(Union Syndicaliste des Travailleurs 
Kanak et Exploités). After the fi rst 
round, the runoff pitted  Frogier/
Yanno against the two Charleses, a 
replay of the 1980s’ ethnic polariza-
tion because each side had a differ-
ent attitude toward the consensual 
accords that had brought peace. As 
in the presidential election, the more 
numerous loyalists rallied behind the 
rpcr-ump. Frogier and Yanno both 
won their deputy seats, by percentages 
of 54–46 and 69–31, respectively, and 
they quickly proposed to ump voters 
in the defeated ae that they ally with 
the rpcr in a “presidential” majority 
in Congress against the fl nks (NC, 
12 June, 18 June, 25 July 2007). 
The ump prevailed in France as 
well, where it preserved its absolute 
majority in the National Assembly, 
while the udf, Communists, and fn 
all declined. François Fillon, whom 
President Sarkozy had named as his 
prime minister, kept his job (NC, 12 
June 2007). But there was no direct 
link between the French presidential 
and legislative elections and the Con-
gress of New Caledonia, which the ae 
still ran along with the Southern Prov-
ince. The rpcr had already controlled 
the two deputy seats for twenty years, 
but would the ump victory in France 
change power relations in Noumea? 
The rpcr-ump certainly wanted that, 
just as they had used the reelection of 
Lafl eur as deputy in 1982 as a lever to 
challenge a ruling coalition between 
pro-independence and centrist par-
ties in the local Governing Council 
back then, claiming the majority had 
spoken, but to no avail. The rpcr-
ump now “offered its hand” to other 
loyalists in the Congress so that it 
could try to regain its former place in 
local governing institutions (NC, 25 
June 2007). Prevented from expand-
ing its voice from local politics to the 
French Parliament and torn by the 
divided loyalties of its ump members, 
the ae dialogued with the rpcr-ump 
for over a month, fi nally agreeing to 
reshuffl e some positions in Congress 
after Thémereau resigned as president 
of the government executive due to 
exhaustion, which forced the Congress 
to elect a new territorial leader and 
cabinet (NC, 24 July 2007).
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The centrist ae arose essentially in 
opposition to Lafl eur’s dominance for 
a quarter century, so would its ump 
members accept Frogier’s offer to form 
a new majority in the Congress? Two 
key policies of the ae might become 
obstacles to such an arrangement: 
its adherence to the Noumea Accord 
(with its implied collegiality in deci-
sion-making), and its socioeconomic 
policy to help those middle and lower 
income people who were not part of 
the old ruling elite that had battled 
with Maurice Lenormand’s multieth-
nic, autonomist version of the uc in 
the 1950s and 1960s. While Frogier 
now attacked the Noumea Accord, 
former rpcr dissident Martin (whom 
Lafl eur had once tried but failed to 
remove as mayor of Paita) pointed 
out that the ae position conformed 
with that of Sarkozy’s new Overseas 
Secretary Christian Estrosi—namely, 
that the Noumea Accord was the 
lawful path to follow, since it had 
been made part of the French constitu-
tion in 1999 (NC, 26 June 2007). But 
Sarkozy had already tried to promote 
a unifi cation of loyalists like Frogier 
and Martin under the ump banner 
in 2006 (in a publicized event now 
known as “the sandwich accord”), 
and now that he was president, Sar-
kozy continued that effort. By July, 
Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes ran a 
headline announcing that the ae “bites 
the sandwich,” as Martin and Gomes 
agreed to share power with Frogier, 
while Leroux and Thémereau both 
resigned from the executive, though 
they would remain in the Congress. 
Sarkozy had promised that the French 
State would remain an impartial arbi-
ter, and Estrosi promised a meeting of 
the annual Noumea Accord Signers 
Committee before the end of the year 
(NC, 20 July 2007). 
By the end of the month, the 
“sandwich” became a signed accord, 
as Frogier too would resign from the 
territorial executive but remain in 
Congress, and Estrosi would support 
ae socioeconomic policies, including 
favoring locals in hiring. Frogier was 
elected president of Congress, defeat-
ing his fl nks opponent by two to one, 
and congressional vice presidencies 
were divided among the rpcr (2), ae 
(3), and fl nks (3) (NC, 31 July 2007; 
pir, 31 July 2007). In August, the 
fi rst vote for the executive failed due 
to an “error,” as two ballots stuck 
together in the urn and were disquali-
fi ed, which led to an fl nks walkout 
because it would thus have gotten 
only three positions in the cabinet (as 
before). The voting procedure was 
then improved, but in the revote, 
Christiane Gambey of the ae (and 
lks, or Libération Kanak Socialiste) 
deliberately left her ballot blank, thus 
enabling the fl nks to gain four cabi-
net seats proportionally (with 18 out 
of 35 votes instead of 36). Gambey, 
the only Kanak representative from 
the South (because most Kanak vote 
in their home districts, not where they 
work), said she was protesting against 
the rpcr’s longtime foot-dragging on 
the Noumea Accord, such as creat-
ing a local citizenship, and its earlier 
opposition to peaceful solutions in the 
early 1980s (NC, 15 Aug 2007; pir, 13 
Aug 2007). Yet even with four cabinet 
posts out of eleven, it was clear that 
the independence cause was supported 
by only one-third of the total popula-
tion (but by perhaps 80 percent of 
Kanak). 
The fl nks had displayed new unity 
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in the French legislative elections, and 
even after failing to win a seat (when 
the old uc had dominated representa-
tion in Paris in the 1950s and 1960s, 
thanks to Lenormand and Kanak 
leader Roch Pidjot), it had lobbied 
hard in Paris to get the new regime to 
support the Noumea Accord, while 
also renewing its own friendships with 
the Socialists and other metropolitan 
parties (NC, 4 July 2007). In October, 
uc President Pascal Naouna com-
plained that the congressional major-
ity got angry when fl nks delegates 
spoke of independence, arguing that 
French State support for the Noumea 
Accord was now the main source of 
hope in decolonization. But he admit-
ted that locally “it is necessary to con-
quer a new electorate” by “convincing 
the others,” namely, enough loyalists 
to win the required 60 percent vote 
in Congress to hold a referendum on 
independence toward the end of the 
decade or soon after (NC, 1 Oct 2007). 
In November, Charles Pidjot replaced 
Naouna as head of the uc in a 96–83 
vote and soon said of the radical-
ized loyalists, “We don’t need them 
in order to discuss with Paris and to 
move forward on the Noumea Accord 
and the emancipation of the country” 
(NC, 5 Nov, 9 Nov 2007). With the 
Signers Committee meeting approach-
ing, as well as municipal elections in 
2008 and provincial elections in 2009, 
the fl nks sought to solidify its new 
unity and push for the rapid transfer 
of more self-governing powers to the 
country. Spokesperson Victor Tutu-
goro admitted that “independence 
can cause fear,” so “to win in 2014, 
we must go beyond our own walls to 
go look for the others beyond” (NC, 
10 Dec 2007). Kanak activist Sari-
min Boengkih reminded Frogier in a 
letter that the United Nations had 
passed a Declaration of the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples in September that 
supported indigenous self-government 
and autonomy over economic devel-
opment within the offi cial borders of 
an established country, and that the 
Kanak opposed assimilation (kol, 
24 Oct 2007). 
Estrosi got off to a rocky start as 
overseas secretary in October, when he 
formally visited French High Commis-
sioner Michel Mathieu in Noumea. 
As part of a general strike, ustke held 
a barbecue nearby with loud music 
playing, so Estrosi complained about 
the lack of State police action against 
union blockades, a common problem 
in New Caledonia. Mathieu resigned 
in protest, an unprecedented action, 
and Sarkozy quickly replaced him 
with Yves Dassonville, who assured 
the public that the State would play 
a more active role in mediating labor 
disputes and that he regarded police 
action only as a last resort (NC, 15 
Oct, 10 Nov 2007). Meanwhile, 
Estrosi espoused the Signers Commit-
tee meeting, which at fi rst displeased 
Frogier, because he opposed a “social-
ist” reading of the Noumea Accord 
that implied possible independence 
(NC, 8 Oct 2007). Trying to straddle 
the local political spectrum, Estrosi 
also saw the ae as a legitimate partner 
in the Signers Committee dialogue, 
along with the rpcr and fl nks, 
which had signed the accord in 1998 
along with Socialist Prime Minister 
Lionel Jospin (NC, 18 Oct 2007). The 
ae was regrouping and prepared a 
detailed agenda for the December 
signers meeting in Paris, which Prime 
Minister Fillon himself took charge of 
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(NC, 19 Oct, 29 Oct 2007). The result 
was a document that prioritized the 
irreversible transfer of more self-gov-
erning powers to New Caledonia, thus 
backing the ae /fl nks version of the 
accord, as well as promising State help 
with economic development, particu-
larly the new nickel mining projects 
to balance the North and South while 
paying closer attention to environ-
mental issues such as protecting the 
offshore reef, addressing infrastructure 
issues, providing housing and educa-
tion for those with lower incomes, 
dealing with contentious labor dis-
putes, hosting the Pacifi c Games in 
2011, and enhancing France’s role 
in the Pacifi c Forum now that New 
Caledonia and French Polynesia had 
become associate members. The ae 
and fl nks were happy, and the rpcr 
touted consensus and downplayed the 
power transfers (NC, 22 Dec, 27 Dec 
2007).
Economic growth in New Caledo-
nia is higher than in any other French 
overseas entity, though the  country 
also has serious socioeconomic 
challenges. On the basis of overall 
statistics, the economy is healthy, 
with low infl ation and rising con-
sumption, rising job creation and 
decreasing unemployment, but high 
housing costs are reaching the level 
of Paris, partly because metropolitan 
offi cials and retirees receive almost 
double the salary or pension they 
would receive in France. Rising urban 
population is causing more crowd-
ing in homes and expanding squat-
ter camps and homelessness, and the 
primarily Kanak-inhabited North and 
Islands provinces have higher poverty 
and unemployment rates and lower 
educational levels. Nearly 40 percent 
of the potential working population 
lack high school diplomas, while new 
immigration provides a fi fth of the 
annual demographic growth that is 
expected to bring the total population 
to 250,000 in 2008 (NC, 15 Feb 2007). 
In response, the ae-led government 
has increased family allowances, low-
ered prices for essential products like 
food, frozen rents for a year, expanded 
social services, and raised the mini-
mum wage (NC, 29 June 2007). It has 
also tried to increase tourism, espe-
cially from China, but the dominance 
of mining and the fl ow of French aid 
keeps New Caledonia tourism small 
in scale; in addition, agriculture has 
suffered from rainstorms, so there 
is ongoing dependence on budget-
ary help and development contracts 
from Paris. In December, the Congress 
passed a us$2 billion budget, fi nanced 
partly from new local taxes and the 
rest from French or European Union 
fi nancial aid (NC, 21 Nov 2007; pir, 
3 Dec, 14 Dec 2007).
In the most industrial country in 
Oceania, labor unions are quite strong 
and active, and at times their strikes 
become militant and political, push-
ing politicians to complain or listen, 
for example, on the issue of favoring 
local hiring that was inscribed in both 
the Noumea Accord and the organic 
laws that followed (NC, 18 Oct 2007). 
Faced with rising living costs, they 
also want their share of the proceeds 
from economic development, so the 
minimum monthly wage was raised 
in January to 120,000 Pacifi c francs, 
or about us$1,200 (NC, 8 Jan 2007). 
Mining unions noted the rising price 
of nickel and demanded a correspond-
ing increase in wages, and those in 
various support or service sectors felt 
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likewise. But social dialogue between 
workers and employers has all too 
often not gone smoothly in New 
Caledonia, leading to roadblocks with 
burning tires and work stoppages 
without enough action by the State, 
positive or negative (NC, 4 Sep, 2 Oct, 
9 Oct 2007). France too has its power-
ful labor unions who strike militantly, 
but in late 2007 Sarkozy battled 
transporters over pension reforms, 
while a thousand people marched in 
Noumea against “terrorism” by local 
unions (bbc News, 13 Nov 2007; NC, 
12 Nov 2007). For example, ustke, 
which Estrosi had criticized, blocked 
the local cement industry and urban 
bus company for months—along with 
other strikes to support favoring local 
hiring and protecting workers fi red 
for union activities—and in October 
ustke called a general strike because 
the police had intervened (NC, 13 Oct 
2007). After testing the waters in the 
presidential and legislative elections 
by backing Bové and then its own 
candidates, respectively, ustke defi ed 
appeals by the fl nks not to divide the 
Kanak vote and formed its own Labor 
Party in November, with support from 
metropolitan Trotskyists, dedicating 
itself to independence, anti-globaliza-
tion, and revolutionary socialism (NC, 
16 Nov 2007). It remained one of the 
two largest unions, as labor lead-
ers compete for membership using 
dramatic strikes to attract support (NC, 
12 April 2007). 
Nickel mining has long been the 
mainstay of New Caledonian exports, 
and that sector is increasing still 
further in importance, raising con-
cerns about vulnerability to ups and 
downs in price cycles and uncertainty 
as competing multinational corpora-
tions buy and sell each other and chief 
executive offi cers come and go. For 
example, since January 2006 the price 
of nickel had jumped 135 percent 
because of the demand for stainless 
steel in China and India. In January 
2007, when a single ship carrying 
1,000 tons of nickel sank off England, 
the price went up another 15 percent 
on the London Metal Exchange, as 
that loss represented nearly a fi fth of 
available world supply. Then in May 
2007, the price per ton dropped by 
us$11,000 due to overspeculation, 
rising competition among producers, 
and a decision by China (which buys 
one fi fth of the global supply) to stop 
imports temporarily. By August, the 
price had dropped another $15,000, 
but by October, it had stabilized at 
about $25,000 a ton, and predictions 
for rising demand in 2008 and a price 
of $35,000 a ton fueled local devel-
opment projects in New Caledonia, 
which has about a third of the world 
nickel reserves (NC, 27 Jan, 14 June, 
23 Aug, 24 Oct 2007). La Société Le 
Nickel (sln), the largest local mining 
company, enjoyed a record profi t in 
2006 and is expanding its produc-
tion at mining sites in the North and 
at the Doniambo processing plant 
outside Noumea, aiming to export 
75,000 tons a year. New Caledonia 
has increased its shares in the sln to 
about one-third, giving it a consider-
able voice in policy-making in a fi rm 
that was once half State-owned and 
held a near-monopoly locally (NC, 15 
March, 25 July 2007). 
In contrast, the territory’s fi nancial 
participation in the Goro nickel plant 
project in the South and its nearby 
power plant at Prony has actually 
dropped from 10 percent to only 5 
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percent, but Goro’s Brazilian part-
ner cvrd (Companhia Vale do Rio 
Doce) assures the government that 
after  initial construction is complete 
and production starts in 2009, the 
royalties will reach 10 percent. The 
Goro-Prony project has been the 
focus of repeated protests because 
of environmental and local hiring 
concerns, but cvrd says that the rise 
in nickel prices will enable it to afford 
better pollution controls, and it has 
increased efforts to train local work-
ers. Raphael Mapou of Rhéébù Nùù 
has therefore changed his stance from 
open opposition to  ongoing vigilance 
(NC, 20 June, 17 Nov, 13 Dec 2007). 
The Koniambo mining and process-
ing project (a partnership between the 
Kanak-run Northern Province and the 
Swiss fi rm Xstrata, with additional 
support from France) will pay 51 per-
cent of dividends to the province, and 
it fi nally got the green light to begin 
construction, while addressing infra-
structure development and environ-
mental and local hiring concerns. In a 
complex fi nancial arrangement made 
by local-born André Dang, director 
of the North’s smsp (Société Minière 
du Sud Pacifi que), the province will 
help pay for its share of construction 
by partnering with the South Korean 
fi rm Posco to process nickel ore at 
a new plant in that country (NC, 26 
Feb, 18–19 Oct 2007). The Goro 
and Koniambo projects each involve 
investments of us$3–4 billion, or 
about twice the territorial budget. 
The Koniambo project in particular is 
important to the fl nks for rebalanc-
ing the territory’s economy by creating 
more income and jobs in the North. 
Even Martin of the South and Loueck-
hote of the Islands applauded the 
project, showing needed support for 
working toward the common destiny 
prescribed by the Noumea Accord (NC, 
28 Dec 2007).
In that spirit, notable progress was 
made in 2007, despite all the politics, 
in efforts to build a multicultural 
citizenship. In April, the government 
created a committee to develop iden-
tity symbols, as the Noumea Accord 
suggested, such as a new name for the 
country (Kanaky New Caledonia?), a 
fl ag, a hymn, banknote images, and a 
motto. The last three would be chosen 
by public competitions, while the 
fi rst two, more contentious, would be 
negotiated in committee. Vice Presi-
dent Déwé Gorodey of Palika assem-
bled twenty representatives of civil 
society, from historians and customary 
leaders to political parties and volun-
tary associations, and told them, using 
Kanak imagery, “The Great House 
we are going to build together is that 
of our children” (NC, 13 April, 28 
Dec 2007). A new, localized primary 
school textbook of history and geogra-
phy was also unveiled, the product of 
three years work by numerous experts 
from every community, complete with 
documents from different viewpoints. 
Historian Christiane Terrier explained 
that it was not an offi cial history 
because, despite accusations to the 
contrary, “We were under no pressure 
from politicians, who never looked 
at the contents” (NC, 24 Feb 2007). 
Congress also voted unanimously to 
create an Academy of Kanak Lan-
guages to preserve and promote the 
continued use of the forty indigenous 
languages and dialects of the country, 
some of which are now being taught 
in schools (NC, 18 Jan 2007; pir, 18 
Jan 2007). Once again on 24 Septem-
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ber, a date that formerly commemo-
rated the French taking possession of 
New Caledonia in 1853, the 150 Years 
Later Committee celebrated a multi-
cultural day of unity around the site 
of the Mwâ Kâ, a symbolic totem pole 
made four years ago by Kanak artists. 
Participants expressed pride in their 
country in music, dance, poetry, and 
refreshments for eight hours, under 
the rubric “Caledonia My Country” 
(NC, 22 Sep 2007). 
david chappell
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Solomon Islands
Solomon Islanders entered 2007 
with expectations that the Manasseh 
Sogavare–led Grand Coalition for 
Change government would make posi-
tive changes, especially in the delivery 
of social services. These expectations 
were created partly by Sogavare 
government’s announcement of its 
Bottom Up Approach to development, 
which promised to develop rural areas 
where a majority of Solomon Island-
ers live. The Bottom Up Approach 
was expected to bring fundamental 
changes in the development of the 
country after decades of dismal perfor-
mance since independence.
The year began with a nagging 
strain on diplomatic relations with 
Australia. The political drama began 
when twelve Solomon Islands police 
offi cers were sent to Taiwan for special 
security training involving fi rearms 
and self-defense. Although fi rearms-
related training was denied by Tai-
wan’s vice foreign minister who visited 
Solomon Islands in February, the 
prime minister continued to stress the 
need to rearm the Personal Protection 
Unit, which normally provides security 
to government ministers and dignitar-
ies. Widespread national and interna-
tional criticism over the rearmament 
proposal followed its announcement. 
Notably, Australian Foreign Minister 
Alexander Downer took the unusual 
step of writing directly to the people of 
Solomon Islands to express his grave 
concern about the state of the rela-
tionship with Australia. In his “Letter 
to the People of Solomon Islands,” 
Downer said: “Australians and your 
regional neighbors who make up 
ramsi [Regional Assistance Mission 
to Solomon Islands] remain commit-
ted to working with you to prevent 
a return to these bad old days; we 
remain committed to keeping ramsi 
in place, so that Solomon Islands 
can continue to move forward.” He 
added that “sadly there seems to be a 
deliberate push to undermine ramsi, 
to tarnish its reputation, and make 
it hard for it to continue its work” 
(Solomon Star News, 9 Feb 2007). 
Prime Minister Sogavare responded 
by accusing Downer of acting undip-
lomatically, pushed to establish a time 
frame for ramsi to leave, and canceled 
two appointments for the designated 
Australian High Commissioner to 
Solomon Islands, Peter Hooton, to 
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present his letter of introduction. 
 Hooton was eventually able to present 
his creden tials, and Sogavare with-
drew the rearmament plan.
As this diplomatic row continued, 
four government members of Parlia-
ment crossed the fl oor and joined the 
opposition group just before Parlia-
ment convened for its fi rst session 
of the year. The group consisted of 
former Prime Ministers Billy Hilly 
and Bartholomew Ulufa‘alu, Deputy 
Prime Minister Job Dudley Tausinga, 
and mp Trevor Olovae. The no-con-
fi dence motion was the second in ten 
months. However, it was disqualifi ed 
by the Speaker of Parliament on the 
grounds that it did not meet the seven 
days notice required by parliamentary 
standing orders. The Speaker would 
only allow the motion to be tabled if 
the Opposition could demonstrate the 
numbers to debate the motion.
Many citizens, however, hoped that 
the prolonged diplomatic row with 
Australia could be resolved because it 
had brought so much negative pub-
licity, and to allow the government 
to concentrate on critical issues of 
national importance. These included 
opening major resource development 
industries, securing opportunities for 
temporary labor markets overseas, 
and creating a political and economic 
environment conducive to promoting 
foreign investment and creating more 
jobs. 
There were concerns that despite its 
promises of a Bottom Up Approach to 
development, the Sogavare-led gov-
ernment had not put in place a plan 
that outlined what needed to be done 
and how it would be implemented. 
Furthermore, Solomon Islands con-
tinued to depend on foreign aid. For 
instance, the 2005 budget showed 
that donors funded 55 percent of the 
recurrent budget and 90 percent of the 
development budget. In 2006, donors 
funded 86 percent of the development 
budget. Heavy reliance on donors 
highlighted the need for the Solomon 
Islands government to take the lead in 
determining its national priorities in 
consultation with other stakeholders, 
and in translating these priorities into 
national development strategies.
As if the country’s political dra-
mas were not enough, on 2 April 
an earthquake measuring 8.1 on the 
Richter scale shook the country, caus-
ing a tsunami that destroyed villages 
in parts of the Western and Choiseul 
provinces. At least fi fty-two people 
were killed, and approximately 36,000 
people left homeless. Western and 
Choiseul provinces were declared 
disaster areas. This triggered a huge 
infl ow of assistance. Despite this, as 
late as 2008 it was reported that many 
of those affected had not yet received 
assistance. This triggered a political 
row between the Western Provincial 
government and the central govern-
ment. In early 2008, while visiting the 
Western Province, newly elected Prime 
Minister Dr Derek Sikua assured 
Western Provincial government that 
his government had earmarked fi fteen 
million Solomon Islands dollars for 
reconstruction and rehabilitation of 
tsunami-affected communities. As the 
focus remained on the tsunami, the 
country was shocked toward the end 
of April by the sudden passing of Joses 
Sanga, a cabinet minister and member 
of Parliament for East Malaita. Sanga 
was a long-serving public servant who 
became a member of Parliament in 
2001. His passing was regarded by 
many as a great loss to the country.
The year 2007 was also dominated 
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by debates surrounding the appoint-
ment of Julian Moti as attorney 
general. Moti was appointed by the 
Sogavare-led government in September 
2006, after Primo Afeau was sacked 
for opposing the terms of reference 
for the commission of inquiry into the 
April 2006 riot. In 1997 Moti had 
been charged for alleged child abuse 
in Vanuatu, but was later acquitted. 
After Moti was appointed, the Aus-
tralian government announced that 
he was wanted in Australia in connec-
tion with the rape case in Vanuatu. 
Moti was arrested in Port Moresby 
by Papua New Guinea police at the 
request of the Australian govern-
ment. He appeared in a Port Moresby 
court, and was taken into custody 
pending extradition to Australia. In 
early October, however, Moti escaped 
to Solomon Islands on a clandestine 
Papua New Guinea Defence Force 
fl ight. A commission of inquiry later 
alleged that the Papua New Guinea 
Prime Minister’s Offi ce was some-
how involved in Moti’s escape, and 
Canberra banned Papua New Guinea 
politicians from entering Australia.
Following Canberra’s extradition 
request, Moti had been suspended 
by the Public Service Commission in 
October 2006. However, the Sogavare 
government exerted political pressure 
on the commission for Moti’s rein-
statement, and he was offi cially sworn 
into offi ce in July 2007. This followed 
the lifting of the suspension order by 
the permanent secretary of the Minis-
try of Public Service. The chairman of 
the Public Service Commission argued 
that the appointment was unconstitu-
tional, and maintained that Moti was 
still suspended. 
In the midst of the debates sur-
rounding Moti’s appointment, the 
government plunged into another 
controversy when it appointed a 
Fijian citizen, Jahir Khan, as com-
missioner of police without widely 
advertising the post. Khan replaced 
former Solomon Islands Police Com-
missioner Shane Castles, an Australian 
citizen who was declared persona non 
grata by the Sogavare government in 
2006 for alleged interference in local 
politics. The decision was not popular, 
attracting criticism from around the 
country.
On 8 August 2007, when Parlia-
ment resumed for its second sitting of 
the year, the Opposition launched a 
third motion of no confi dence against 
the Sogavare government. The reason 
for the motion, the Opposition argued, 
was that the appointments of Moti 
and Khan were improper and not in 
the best interest of the country. On the 
eve of the Parliament’s sitting, how-
ever, Opposition leader Fred Fono was 
arrested and appeared in a  Honiara 
Magistrate’s Court to face two bribery 
charges. It was alleged that in June 
Fono gave 50,000 Solomon Islands 
dollars to a government minister, 
Severino Nuaiasi, to support the 
no-confi dence motion. Fono denied 
the bribery allegations, although he 
admitted giving the money to Nuaiasi 
in response to the minister’s request 
for help to send his son to school in 
New Zealand. The motion of no con-
fi dence was subsequently withdrawn 
amid accusations that the case against 
Fono had been staged by Attorney 
General Moti, who feared that a new 
government would favor Australia’s 
demands for his extradition. However, 
the main reason for the withdrawal 
of the motion may have been that the 
Opposition knew it did not have the 
numbers to unseat Sogavare.
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In the August sitting of Parlia-
ment, the Sogavare-led government 
passed the Prescription of Ministers 
(Amendment) Bill 2007 to increase the 
number of ministers from 20 to 23. 
Parliament also endorsed a review of 
the Facilitation of the International 
Assistance Act, the 2003 legislation 
mandating that ramsi help Solomon 
Islands address its law and order 
problems, following years of armed 
confl ict. The aim of the proposed 
review was to ensure that ramsi play 
a more developmental role, rather 
than focusing primarily on law and 
order issues. At the 2007 UN General 
Assembly session, Foreign Minister 
Patterson Oti asked for UN involve-
ment in future regional peacekeeping 
operations. Oti asserted that “while 
the visiting forces deserve credit for 
restoring law and order the underlying 
social and cultural causes of tensions 
in the Solomon Islands have not been 
addressed” (Pacnews, 3 Oct 2007). 
Oti also criticized Australia for what 
he saw as Canberra’s neocolonial 
actions: “Mine is too nationalistic a 
Government to become captive to the 
fortunes which justify our perpetual 
retention under siege. My Prime Min-
ister, fellow Government ministers and 
parliamentarians, as well as our Attor-
ney-General, remained unmoved by 
Australian resistance to our attempts 
to reclaim our sovereignty and inde-
pendence” (Pacnews, 3 Oct 2007). 
Solomon Islands international 
diplomacy took a further downturn 
when Sogavare boycotted the 2007 
Pacifi c Islands Forum Leaders meet-
ing, which was held in Tonga. The 
boycott was to protest a Pacifi c Islands 
Forum–sponsored review that had 
found ramsi a positive infl uence in 
the country in terms of improving 
law and order and promoting good 
governance. It recommended that 
ramsi should continue to help the 
Solomon Islands government address 
key issues in these areas. The Soga-
vare-led government disagreed with 
the fi ndings, and argued that the 
review team had ignored his govern-
ment’s terms of reference. However, 
the leader of the review team, former 
Fiji Foreign Affairs Minister Kaliopate 
Tavola, noted that the team did take 
into consideration the issues raised 
by the Solomon Islands government. 
Sogavare’s absence at the Forum 
meeting attracted criticism from 
both within the country and outside. 
Instead of attending the Pacifi c Islands 
Forum meeting, Sogavare went to the 
Taiwan/Pacifi c Islands summit in the 
Marshall Islands. The 2007  summit 
was the second such meeting for 
Taiwan and its Pacifi c Islands allies: 
Nauru, the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, 
Palau, Kiribati, and Solomon Islands.
The Forum boycott generated 
allegations that a number of cabinet 
ministers were not happy, and that 
there was a rift in the government. 
However, caucus chairman Nelson 
Ne‘e described as “baseless and an 
alarmist propaganda” the idea that 
Sogavare’s leadership was being ques-
tioned over his boycott of the meeting 
of the Pacifi c Islands Forum Leaders in 
Tonga. He rejected the suggestion that 
there was a rift within government by 
saying: “The Prime Minister always 
consults us before making decisions. 
That’s the way he always operates and 
that’s why we have complete confi -
dence in his leadership of our Govern-
ment.” He went on to say: “The pm’s 
decision to keep his engagements in 
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Majuro and Taipei was the correct 
one for our country at a time when 
the Tonga Forum was dominated by 
concerns which were either not our 
priority or could only be addressed in 
the way our Parliament has already 
decided. pm Sogavare’s absence from 
the Forum meeting was a decision that 
Cabinet fully endorsed.” Ne‘e also 
noted, “The wisdom of that decision 
will be appreciated by our critics when 
the Prime Minister returns and when 
we unveil next year’s budget” (Pac-
news, 18 Oct 2007).
Despite Ne‘e’s denial of a rift within 
the government, by the fi nal quarter 
of 2007 there was little that could be 
done to hide the fact that the Soga-
vare-led government was disintegrat-
ing from within. While the prime 
minister was on a trip to Taiwan in 
October, nine cabinet ministers and 
four backbenchers resigned and joined 
the Opposition. Their loss of confi -
dence in Sogavare was attributed in 
part to several factors: the appoint-
ments of Moti and Khan, the rearma-
ment plan, the failure to normalize 
relations with Australia, and the 
prime minister’s absence at the Pacifi c 
Islands Forum meeting. Those who 
jumped ship included Deputy Prime 
Minister Toswell Kaua, Minister for 
Education Dr Derek Sikua, Minister 
for Planning and Aid Coordination 
Steve Abana, Nollen Leni, Stanley 
 Festus Sofu, Minister of Finance 
Gordon Darcy Lilo, Sam Iduri, Mark 
Kemakeza, Patrick Vahoe Jr, Peter 
Tom, Martin Sopaghe, Martin Magga, 
and Trevor Olovae.
The members who resigned joined 
the Opposition, formed a new coali-
tion, and called on Sogavare to 
step aside. In a letter delivered to 
the governor-general, Sir Nathaniel 
Waena, on 11 November 2007, the 
new coalition requested that Soga-
vare step down because he no longer 
enjoyed majority support from the 
parliamentarians. Furthermore, 28 of 
the 50 members of Parliament signed 
a memorandum of understanding that 
stipulated their lack of confi dence in 
Sogavare’s leadership style. Sogavare, 
however, refused to step down, claim-
ing that he still had enough support in 
Parliament: “I am elected by parlia-
ment and only parliament can vote me 
out” (Pacnews, 13 Oct 2007) 
The weeks that followed were tense 
and fi lled with political maneuvering. 
In a political somersault, some mem-
bers of Parliament who had joined the 
Opposition rejoined the government 
and were made ministers (Pacnews, 13 
Nov 2007). The three members were 
Martin Maga (representing Temotu 
Pele), Trevor Olavae (for South Vella 
La Vella), and Martin Sopaghe (for 
North Guadalcanal). In the meantime 
three government ministers moved to 
the Opposition on 13 November. The 
political crisis continued for more than 
three weeks, and ministerial  portfolios 
were left vacant as the government 
had insuffi cient numbers to fi ll them 
all. In the face of concerns that this 
was becoming a constitutional  crisis, 
Governor-General Sir Nathaniel 
Waena was urged to step in. He 
refused, arguing that the impasse had 
to be solved politically, in Parliament. 
After weeks of uncertainty the gover-
nor-general announced that Parliament 
would convene on 13 December. This 
was challenged by the prime minister, 
who wanted to schedule the meeting 
for 24 December; he argued that this 
was necessary to allow time for the 
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newly appointed minister of fi nance to 
prepare the 2008 appropriation bill. 
Sogavare took the matter to court, but 
on 12 December the Solomon Islands 
High Court dismissed the case. In 
delivering his decision, Justice Edwin 
Goldsborough described Sogavare’s 
case as “frivolous and vexatious” 
(stn, 12 Dec 2007).
Parliament convened on Thursday 
13 December 2007, and a motion of 
no confi dence in the prime minister 
was tabled. As Parliament debated 
the motion, there was much anxiety 
about a possible repeat of the April 
2006 riot. Security was high as the 
police presence around Parliament 
increased. After a long day of debate, 
Sogavare was voted out of offi ce in 
a 25 to 22 vote. On 20 December 
2007, as the country prepared to 
celebrate Christmas, Dr Derek Sikua 
was elected prime minister, beating 
his only rival, Patterson Oti, by 32 
votes to 15. It was an overwhelming 
demonstration of a lack of confi dence 
in Sogavare and those, like Oti, who 
continued to support him. In the days 
that followed, Sikua put together a 
government dubbed the Coalition for 
National Unity and Rural Advance-
ment (c-nura).
Moti was arrested and extradited to 
Australia soon after the new govern-
ment took over. Sogavare questioned 
the legality of the deportation in view 
of an order by the Magistrate Court to 
halt any action until an asylum appli-
cation was heard. Police Commis-
sioner Jahir Khan’s contract was not 
renewed. In a letter to Khan, Prime 
Minister Sikua offered two options: 
resign or face a tribunal under the 
Police Act. According to a local online 
news bulletin, the Sikua-led govern-
ment was concerned with Khan’s 
push to rearm the local police force. 
Khan agreed to leave when his con-
tract fi nishes in June 2008. In a move 
to normalize ties with Australia and 
its neighbors, Prime Minister Sikua 
went on a three-nation tour, visiting 
the prime ministers of Australia, New 
Zealand, and Papua New Guinea. In 
a press statement, Sikua noted that 
the tour was “largely a symbolic one 
for the government to reassure the 
neighbouring countries that Solomon 
Islands values its relations with them” 
(stn, 29 Jan 2007). He also took the 
opportunity to express his regrets for 
any diffi culties that may have arisen 
while the previous government was in 
power.
Back home Sikua announced that 
his government would reduce the 
number of political appointees or 
advisers from 24 to 11. However, 
during the fi st meeting of the Public 
Accounts Committee in 2008, it was 
revealed that the government would 
increase its appointees from 11 to 20. 
The Opposition was critical of this 
move, describing it as misleading.
By December 2007, Solomon 
Islands had its third government in 
the twenty months since the April 
2006 elections. At the launching of 
the c-nura government policy state-
ments, the prime minister noted that 
his government was focusing on basic 
elements affecting the standard of liv-
ing, such as food security, clean water 
supply and sanitation, rural health 
services, schools, and rural economic 
empowerment. Sikua noted, “We must 
be realistic about the great challenges 
facing us and the limited resources 
available to us to meet those chal-
lenges. . . . We must reject the notion 
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that we can get big amounts of money 
overnight with no hard work. . . . We 
must each take responsibility for our 
own lives and that of our families and 
work hard at it” (stn, 19 Jan 2008). 
It remains to be seen whether these 
policies will succeed. The new gov-
ernment knows that it has to deliver 
tangible results in order to prove to 
the nation that its removal of the 
Sogavare government was not just 
another politically successful motion 
of no confi dence.
brian lenga
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Vanuatu
The fi rst big story in Vanuatu in 2007 
was the arrest, in January, of Peter 
Foster for illegal entry into Vanuatu. 
A high profi le “conman,” Foster was 
facing trial in Fiji for fraud-related 
charges. He escaped from Fiji on 
board the Retriever 1, which dropped 
him off on Efate on 8 January. Aus-
tralian Customs offi cials and Aus-
tralian Federal Police soon became 
involved in the investigation, as they 
had concerns that the Retriever 1 was 
being used to smuggle drugs and guns 
(Australian, 19 Jan 2007). In Janu-
ary Foster was sentenced to six weeks 
imprisonment for the illegal entry 
and required to pay a fi ne. After three 
weeks in jail he left the country for 
Australia, where he went on to stand 
trial for fraud involving the Feder-
ated States of Micronesia. The crew of 
the Retriever 1 was not so lucky. The 
vessel was impounded in Port Vila and 
various weapons seized. Ultimately the 
only charge that resulted in a convic-
tion was one against the skipper, Kell 
Walker. He had been charged with 
making a threat to kill another person, 
a threat that was made in the context 
of trying to extort money in a salvage 
scam (Public Prosecutor v Walker 
[2007] vusc 61). Walker was sen-
tenced to two years imprisonment, a 
sentence that was upheld on appeal.
Much more serious were the events 
of March, when communities from 
Tanna and Ambrym living in Port Vila 
had a violent confrontation. Rumors 
had circulated that some men from 
Ambrym had supplied some men 
from Tanna with sorcery, and that 
these Tannese men were using black 
magic techniques to cause deaths. The 
catalyst for the confrontation was 
the death of the wife of a prominent 
pastor. On the morning of 3 March, 
members of the communities clashed 
violently in the Tagabe area. Partici-
pants were armed with knives, axes, 
iron bars, and clubs. Police, probably 
scared by the mobs, did not respond, 
and in this initial confrontation one 
Tannese man was killed. This led to a 
mob from Tanna rampaging through 
the Anabrou area. The mob tar-
geted houses owned by people from 
Ambrym, burning them to the ground. 
By the end of the day, two more men, 
both from Ambyrm, were dead and a 
number of people hospitalized. Some 
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families were also left homeless. On 
4 March a state of emergency was 
declared. Under this state of emer-
gency, which lasted for a fortnight, no 
public assemblies other than church 
services were permitted and police 
powers of detention were extended. 
Police were also authorized to carry 
arms. More than one hundred people 
involved in the incident were arrested 
or detained. The shocked Port Vila 
community remained calm, turning 
their attention to supporting the fami-
lies who had lost their houses.
Little action has been taken since 
the incident. A commission of inquiry 
was established to investigate and 
report on the causes of the violence. In 
September the commission presented 
its report to the Minister of Justice 
and also made an executive summary 
of the report available to the public. 
The fi ndings placed a lot of the blame 
for the incident on failures on the part 
of the police force. While the terms of 
reference stated that it was a public 
inquiry, the Minister of Justice ordered 
the media to stop publishing the fi nd-
ings. The full report has never been 
made public, which has raised suspi-
cion that it is critical of the govern-
ment. There have been no apparent or 
visible changes in the police following 
the report. A number of people were 
charged with offenses following their 
actions on 3 March, but none of these 
cases have come to trial yet.
Rumors of problems within the 
governing coalition led by Ham Lini 
of the National United Party (nup) 
were circulating from the beginning of 
the year. The coalition had survived 
fi ve motions of no confi dence since it 
was established in December 2004, 
and numerous cabinet reshuffl es have 
taken place. Despite the rumors no 
signifi cant changes were made until 
early May. These changes were pre-
cipitated by the Luganville Municipal 
Council (lmc) elections, which took 
place at the end of April. The cam-
paign period itself was fairly quiet, 
marred only by allegations that Serge 
Vohor of the Union of Moderate Par-
ties (ump) assaulted three candidates 
from the Vanuatu Republican Party 
(vrp) (VDP, 21 April 2007). The elec-
tion results were as follows: Greens 
Confederation (gc) 4 seats; nup 3 
seats; vrp 2 seats; Vanuatu National 
Party (vnp) 2 seats; National Com-
munity Association (nca) 1 seat; and 
Vanua‘aku Party (vp) 1 seat. Initially 
a memorandum of understanding to 
run the Luganville Municipal Council 
was signed between nup, vrp, vp, and 
nca, all parties in Lini’s governing 
coalition. However, vrp defected, and 
the council ended up being controlled 
by a coalition of gc, vrp, and vnp, 
with the mayor being vnp’s Jonah 
Reuben. Reuben died less than two 
months after the election, so the com-
position of the municipal council is 
not set and Luganville will face further 
elections in 2008.
Vanuatu Republican Party Secre-
tary General Marcelline Pipite, who 
had signed the initial memorandum 
of understanding on behalf of his 
party, was blamed for vrp’s defection. 
He lost his position as Minister for 
Agriculture and was suspended from 
vrp for one month. The vrp party 
coordinator, Siri George, was also sus-
pended by vrp President and Minister 
for Lands Maxime Carlot Korman. 
Two weeks later Donna Browney, also 
of vrp, was appointed as Minister 
of Agriculture, thereby retaining the 
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coalition balance. Once Pipite’s sus-
pension fi nished he reinstated George, 
a move that could be interpreted as 
indicating a split. In mid-June this split 
became apparent, with two vrp mem-
bers of Parliament being in govern-
ment and two in opposition. By July 
the issues had been resolved and all 
vrp parliamentarians joined together 
in government.
In April and May diffi culties were 
also increasing for the Vanua‘aku Par-
ty’s George Wells, Minister of Internal 
Affairs. Despite being widely respected 
for attempting to address mismanage-
ment in the municipal and provincial 
councils, Wells found himself subject 
to disciplinary procedures under the 
vp party rules. The nature of the 
allegations against Wells is not clear, 
other than vague assertions that he 
had failed to promote vp interests, but 
following these procedures the party 
decided to remove Wells as a minister 
(VDP, 12 April 2007). However, Ham 
Lini did not act on the decision of the 
party executive, and Wells remained 
as minister. In early June, having lost 
vp support, Wells chose to move to 
nup. He immediately lost his position 
as Minister of Internal Affairs, as this 
was reserved for vp under the terms 
of the coalition agreement. Philip 
Boedoro took over this portfolio.
On 11 June a motion of no confi -
dence was deposited in Parliament. 
Issues underlying the motion included 
management of the Vanuatu Com-
modities Marketing Board (vcmb), 
improper conduct of ministers, and 
failure by the government to deal with 
such conduct. The motion gained 
suffi cient signatures when vp left 
the coalition. vp’s move meant that 
Edward Natapei, Philip Boedoro, Joe 
Natuman, and Isabelle Donald all lost 
their ministerial portfolios. Labour 
Party Member of Parliament Joshua 
Kalsakau, who had signed the motion, 
accepted the position of Minister of 
Justice. Next, the Union of Moder-
ate Parties defected from the opposi-
tion, with Serge Vohor becoming the 
Minister of Public Utilities, Keasipae 
Song the Minister for Internal Affairs, 
and Charlot Salwai the Minister for 
Education (Independent, 17 June 
2007). With ump’s move into govern-
ment, the motion of no confi dence 
no longer had suffi cient support and 
was withdrawn. The Vanua‘aku Party 
also returned to the government, 
resulting in a small opposition of only 
ten members. The opposition, under 
the leadership of Greens mp Moana 
Carcasses Kalosil, formed a shadow 
cabinet, the fi rst time an opposition 
has ever done so.
The Minister of Public Utilities 
portfolio includes oversight of Air 
Vanuatu, and Vohor soon began to 
make changes to the composition of 
the airlines’ board. Harry Iauko, a vp 
stalwart, and all other board members 
were terminated, and a new board 
constituted under ump’s Alfred Maliu. 
This new board wanted to reinstate 
Jospeh Laloyer and appoint former 
Chief Executive Offi cer Jean Paul Vire-
lala as a consultant. Both of these men 
had been terminated in 2005, with 
Virelala being awarded a large com-
pensation payment (see Jowitt 2006).
In the middle of July, news of 
Vanuatu’s largest bank fraud surfaced. 
Three parliamentarians’ allocation 
checks had been altered and presented 
to the National Bank of Vanuatu. The 
members involved were Dunstan Hil-
ton (the Minister of Youth and Sport), 
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Noel Tamata, and Malon Hops-
mander, all of the Peoples Progressive 
Party (ppp). An Indo-Fijian, Salendra 
Sen Sinha, who had previously been 
charged with counterfeiting (although 
no conviction resulted) was implicated 
as a central fi gure. As the investiga-
tion went on, more people, including 
Andre Lesines, the former fi rst politi-
cal adviser to ppp’s Sato Kilman, were 
implicated. Sinha escaped Vanuatu 
and fl ed to Fiji, but others, including 
the three members of Parliament, have 
been charged, with the trial to take 
place in 2008.
By the end of July another cabinet 
reshuffl e took place, in which both 
PPP and ump were removed. This 
reshuffl e saw Sato Kilman lose the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to George 
Wells (nup); Vohor lose the Ministry 
of Public Utilities to Edward Nata-
pei (vp); Salwai lose the Ministry of 
Education to Leinavao Tasso (vp); 
and Song lose the Ministry of Inter-
nal Affairs to Joe Natuman (vp). In 
early August, Greens mp Roro Sambo 
was appointed Minister of Youth and 
Sport. Immediately after ump was 
ousted from the cabinet, Vohor alleged 
that the move was a result of Chinese 
interference, as Vohor had, in the past, 
supported Taiwan (see Jowitt 2005). 
Not much credence was given to these 
claims, since more apparent motiva-
tors included the behavior of Vohor in 
relation to Air Vanuatu and the desire 
for Lini to make room for vp in the 
cabinet. The government remained 
stable until the end of the year in part 
perhaps due to Lini’s frequent warn-
ings that any proposed motion of no 
confi dence would result in the dissolu-
tion of Parliament.
On 26 September the Sanma Pro-
vincial Council elections went ahead. 
Nine parties won seats on the eigh-
teen-person council, with the Union of 
Moderate Parties, the Vanuatu Repub-
lican Party, and Nagriamel being the 
only parties to win more than two 
seats. There was some maneuvering, 
with an initial memorandum of under-
standing indicating that ump would 
be shut out of leadership (VDP, 3 Oct 
2007), but when the council was 
formed the Nagriamel members found 
themselves outside the governing 
coalition, with vrp gaining the presi-
dency and ump the vice presidency 
(VDP, 5 Oct 2007). This had little 
apparent impact on national politics, 
in part because political representation 
in Sanma is so fragmented, and many 
of the parties do not have representa-
tion in the national government.
Mismanagement in statutory bodies 
has continued to be a theme in 2007, 
with the government beginning to take 
decisive action to curb problems. As 
mentioned earlier, the Air Vanuatu 
board had been subject to political 
interference, a problem that has been 
ongoing for years. In August the board 
was reduced from about thirty to just 
seven members, a move that reduces 
costs and minimizes political appoint-
ments. The Council of Ministers also 
decided to sell 46 percent of its shares 
in the airline (VDP, 13 Aug 2007). The 
Vanuatu Maritime Authority, which 
has frequently faced allegations of 
corruption, was abolished in Decem-
ber, with the repeal of the Vanuatu 
Maritime Authority Act. The Vanuatu 
Commodities and Marketing Board 
was subject to a review in the second 
half of the year, and there have been 
media reports that the vcmb Act will 
be the next to be repealed.
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In December the government insti-
tuted the Governance for Growth pro-
gram, which is supported by AusAID. 
This program “supports reforms that 
will provide better quality expendi-
ture and public investment . . . aims 
to improve public fi nancial manage-
ment and statistics and . . . also sup-
ports reforms to telecommunications 
competition, rural electrifi cation, 
commodities marketing and airline 
reform” (AusAID 2007). A decision to 
end the monopoly of Telecom Vanu-
atu Ltd fi ve years earlier than planned 
was endorsed in the last sitting of 
 Parliament.
Land issues are another continuing 
theme, particularly concerns about 
improper land sales. Minister for 
Lands Maxime Carlot Korman was 
the subject of several media reports 
alleging corruption in the signing 
of leases and the issuing of negotia-
tors certifi cates (VDP, 21 April 2007, 
23 June 2007; rnzi 4 July 2006), 
although he has continued in his 
position. The land sale that attracted 
the most attention involved a piece of 
waterfront property on Fatumaru Bay. 
Businesses on both sides of the land 
had bid to purchase it, with the land 
being “won” by Chantilly’s. Allega-
tions of improper land dealings by 
the Port Vila Municipal Council and 
the Minister of Lands arose, and a 
commission of inquiry into the actions 
of the Port Vila Municipal Council 
in relation to this land sale has been 
launched (Minister of Internal Affairs 
Order, 30 Aug 2007). Previously land 
sales have largely been focused on 
Efate and Santo, but now concerns 
over land sales on other islands, 
including Epi and Gaua, are beginning 
to surface. In a positive move to curb 
land disputes on Efate, the Vaturisu 
Council of Chiefs met for the fi rst time 
in many years in February. At this 
meeting a set of Vaturisu custom land 
laws, to govern Efate, was endorsed 
and released. The Vaturisu also have 
an important role in resolving land 
claims being made by the Vete Asso-
ciation, a group from Tongoa that 
claims to have customary ownership 
of land in Port Vila.
Some issues have come up in rela-
tion to custom authorities in Vila, with 
the Port Vila Town Council of Chiefs 
being dissolved by the Malvatumauri 
or National Council of Chiefs in late 
May. The Malvatumarui claimed that 
the town council was not doing its job 
properly and was not properly repre-
sentative (VDP, 12 June 2007). While 
the town council was soon reestab-
lished, it raised the issue that the chiefs 
are being expected to maintain law 
and order in town and to step in when 
police fail, although the police are 
given all the resources to maintain law 
and order.
More general environmental issues 
have also been prominent in 2007. 
In addition to illegal logging activi-
ties on Efate (Independent, 3 June 
2007), there has been concern about 
two Chinese-funded projects that 
could cause considerable environ-
mental damage, an oil palm project 
on Santo and a fi sh-processing plant 
in Port Vila. Neither appears to have 
been subject to proper environmental 
impact assessment studies, and there 
are allegations that the establishment 
of the fi sh-processing plant is also 
bypassing other laws (Independent, 2 
Sept 2007). Community opposition to 
the projects has been strong, with an 
association known as rapt, or Resi-
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dents Against Tuna Processing in Port 
Vila, launching court action to try to 
get the development stopped.
Finally, the US Millennium Chal-
lenge Account (mca) infrastructure 
development projects, which were 
meant to have commenced in 2007, 
were put on hold when the tender was 
annulled in December. The reason for 
the annulment was that all bids that 
were received were higher than what 
had been budgeted for. Reasons given 
included that “global and regional 
markets have undergone consider-
able change . . . including exchange 
rate movements, cost of transport of 
goods and equipment and of critical 
inputs for construction [and] increased 
demand in the regional construction 
marketplace” (mca Vanuatu, 13 Dec 
2007). The scope of the infrastructure 
project is now being reexamined.
anita jowitt
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